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Abstract
We consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to
a buyer having k slots. Under independent pricing, a pure strategy equilibrium
often does not exist and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never e¢ cient. When
bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an
e¢ cient technology-rentingequilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case
of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned, all equilibria are
e¢ cient. Comparing the mixed strategy equilibrium with the technology-renting
equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyers surplus. Finally, we
derive clear-cut policy implications.
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1 Introduction
Sellers with di¤erent portfolios of products often compete for limited slots (or shelf space)
of a buyer who wants to build up her1 own portfolio. In these situations, sellers may
employ bundling as a strategy to win the competition for slots. Even though bundling
has been a major antitrust issue and a subject of intensive research, no paper has studied
how bundling a¤ects portfolioscompetition for slots. We provide a new perspective on
bundling by addressing this issue.
Examples of the situations we described above are abundant. For instance, in the
entertainment industry, movies compete for slots on a cineplex screen and television net-
works compete for slots on the cable lineup. Indeed, allocation of slots in movie theaters
was one of the main issues raised in the movie industry during the last presidential elec-
tion in France.2 Furthermore, bundling in the movie industry (known as block booking3)
was declared illegal in two Supreme Court decisions in the U.S.: U.S. v. Paramount
Pictures (1948) and U.S. v. Loews (1962).4
In retailing, manufacturers may practice bundling (often called full-line forcing) and/or
exclusive dealing to win competition for retail shelf space.5 For instance, the French Com-
petition Authority ned Société des Caves de Roquefort for using selectivity or exclusivity
contracts with supermarket chains.6 In addition, slotting fees (the payments by manu-
1We use hefor each seller and shefor the buyer.
2Cahiers du Cinema (April, 2007) proposed to limit the number of copies per movie since certain
movies, by saturating screens, restrict other moviesaccess to screens and asked each presidential can-
didates opinion about the policy proposal.
3Block booking is the practice of licensing, or o¤ering for license, one feature or group of features
on the condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features released by
distributors during a given period (Unites States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156
(1948)).
4More recently, in MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp. (11th Circuit, April 1999), the
Court of Appeals rea¢ rmed the per se illegal status of block booking.
5For instance, Procter and Gamble uses golden-storearrangement such that to be considerd a golden
store, a retailer must agree to carry 40 or so P&G items displayed together. See P&G has big plans
for the shelves of tiny stores in emgering nations, Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2007.
6Société des Caves de Roqueforts market share in the Roquefort cheese market was 70% but, through
the contract, could occupy eight among all nine brands that Carrefour, a supermarket chain, sold.
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facturers for retail shelf space) have been the subject of recent antitrust litigation7 and
the focus of Federal Trade Commission studies.
In our model, we assume away any private information of the buyer, which allows us
to depart from the existing literature on bundling that usually embraces a framework
of second-degree price discrimination and to identify what can be a rst-order e¤ect
of bundling. In fact, the second-degree price discrimination explanation of bundling is
inconsistent with the facts of Paramount and Loews since the prices of the blocks varied
a great deal across markets (Kenney and Klein, 1983). Furthermore, recent advances in
information technologies and the internet allow rms to o¤er personalized prices to each
customer (an individual or a rm).8
We consider a simultaneous pricing game between two sellers (or rms) A and B,
who o¤er their products to a buyer having k( 1) slots. Each seller has a xed number
of distinct products. We suppose that the prototype of each product is already made
and thus the xed cost of production has already been incurred. We call a product a
digital good if the marginal cost of producing an extra unit is zero. The buyer has a unit
demand for each product but a product needs to occupy a slot to generate value. We
assume free disposal. In this setup, we study how the outcome of competition depends
on the nature of products (digital goods or not) and on the di¤erent bilateral contractual
arrangements between each seller and the buyer.
Our model ts well United States v. Loews (1962), where block booking was prac-
ticed by six major distributors of pre-1948 copyrighted motion picture feature lms for
television exhibition. As in our model, the movies had already been produced, and each
distributor could bundle a large number of movies and charge a personalized price to
7One case is R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 363 (M.D.N.C. 2002),
in which Reynolds Tobacco accused Philip Morris of using a "Retail Leaders" contract that provides
discounts to retailers on its popular Marlboro brand in exchange for the most advantageous display and
signage space in retail establishments. See also American Booksellers Assn, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble,
Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Intimate Bookshop, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 88 F.
Supp. 2d 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.C.C. 2000), revd, 246
F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
8A number of papers (Chen and Iyer, 2002, Choudhary et al., 2005, Ghose and Huand, 2009, Sha¤er
and Zheng, 2002, Thisse and Vives, 1988) model personalized pricing as perfect price discrimination as
we do in our paper.
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each di¤erent TV station. For instance, Loews exacted from KWTV a contract for the
entire Loews library of 723 movies, involving payments of $314,725.20. In addition, our
free disposal assumption seems to be satised since the policies of a distributor (C&C
Super Corp.) resulted in at least one station having to take a package in which certain
of the lms were unplayable, since they had a foreign language sound track.(U.S. v.
Loews). Of course, in our analysis, we regard movies as digital goods even though the
notion of digital goods did not exist at the time of U.S. v. Loews.
A reference pricing strategy is independent pricing, which means that a seller
chooses a price for each product and the price of each set of products is the sum of
the individual prices of the products in the set. We dene bundlingas any contract
that species a price for every subset of a sellers portfolio, but is di¤erent from indepen-
dent pricing. Two particular forms of bundling are of interest: technology-rentingand
pure bundling. First, technology-renting means that a seller rents his technology at a
xed fee such that upon paying the fee, the buyer can buy any subset of the sellers port-
folio at the marginal cost of producing the subset. Hence, technology-renting generalizes
marginal cost pricing to a situation in which a seller sells multiple distinct products. Sec-
ond, pure bundling means that a seller puts all his products into one bundle and o¤ers
only that bundle. Note, however, that we assume free disposal (except in Section 6 on
slotting contracts). Hence, even though the buyer buys the bundle of all products of a
rm, she may then not use all of them. In the case of digital goods, pure bundling and
technology-renting are equivalent under the assumption of free disposal.
Our main results are the following. First, under independent pricing, the fact that
a multi-product rm faces competition among his own products can make equilibrium
in pure strategies fail to exist; this non-existence is generic in the case of digital goods.9
Furthermore, any mixed strategy equilibrium involves an ine¢ cient allocation of slots and
we characterize a mixed-strategy equilibrium for the case of k = 2. Second, each rm
has an incentive to practice bundling since bundling eliminates competition among ones
own products and thereby reduces damages from rival products. Third, bundling restores
the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies without causing ine¢ ciency. When
9In the same setting, Jeon and Menicucci (2009) consider sequential pricing and nd that an equilib-
rium in pure strategies always exists but that it often leads to an ine¢ cient allocation of slots.
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bundling is allowed, there always exists an e¢ cient equilibrium in which each rm uses a
technology-renting strategy, as is known from Bernheim and Whinston (1986, 1998) and
OBrien and Sha¤er (1997). Under a mild condition related to decreasing marginal social
values of products, called weak m-submodularity, all equilibria are e¢ cient if either
all products are digital goods or sales below marginal cost are prohibited; furthermore,
under the condition, each players payo¤ is uniquely determined.10 Finally, when we
compare the mixed-strategy equilibrium to the technology-renting equilibrium, we nd
that the rmstotal prots are often higher in the former than in the latter, implying
that bundling often increases the buyers surplus.11 We illustrate these results through
a simple example in Section 2.
To see the incentive to practice bundling, consider a simple setting in which products
are digital goods and have independent values. Firm A o¤ers two products of value 5
each, rm B o¤ers one product of value 2, and the buyer has two slots. Suppose that A
wants to sell both products. Then, under independent pricing, each product of A faces
competition from Bs product and A realizes a prot of 5   2 = 3 from each and hence
a total prot of 6. Let now A o¤er only the bundle of the two products. Then, without
buying the bundle, the buyer can ll the slots with only Bs product. If instead she
buys the bundle, she can replace Bs product with As and thus A realizes a prot of
10   2 = 8. Basically, under independent pricing the buyer has the option to buy only
one product from A and to ll the second slot with Bs product. Bundling eliminates
this option and thereby prevents As own products from competing with each other.
The intuition for why all equilibria under bundling are e¢ cient is simple for digital
goods with independent values. Imagine a situation in which a product occupying a slot
is inferior to a product that is not occupying any slot. Then the seller owning the latter
can include it in his bundle or, if not currently selling any bundle to the buyer, can
provide this product on its own. Since the product is superior, it can be protably sold
as long as the production cost is below the products incremental value, which always
occurs for digital goods.
10We also identify another condition, which we call unilateral improvement, under which all equi-
libria are e¢ cient, but di¤erent equilibria may yield di¤erent payo¤s to the players.
11In addition, under certain conditions, rms face a prisoners dilemma since each rm has a weak
incentive to practice bundling but is weakly better o¤ with independent pricing (see Proposition 8).
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In Section 6, we extend our results by allowing for slotting contracts. When a seller
o¤ers a bundle with a slotting contract, he can specify the minimum number of slots
that the products in the bundle should occupy; therefore, free disposal does not hold
under slotting contracts. The previous results still hold, except that slotting contracts
can create ine¢ cient equilibria even for digital goods and even when sales below marginal
cost are banned.
Our paper generates clear-cut policy implications. In the case of digital goods,
technology-renting, which is a sort of marginal-cost pricing, is equivalent to pure bundling
(or block booking). Hence any seller can nd a best response among pure bundling strate-
gies (see Lemma 1) and competition among pure bundles leads to an e¢ cient outcome
in which each seller obtains a prot equal to the marginal social contribution of his port-
folio. In addition, under the weak msubmodularitycondition, pure bundling allows
each seller to obtain this prot independently of the rivalsstrategies. This suggests that
pure bundling of digital goods (and hence block booking of movies) is socially desirable
in terms of allocation of slots and does not generate any concern in terms of foreclosure.
For non-digital goods, banning sales below marginal cost is socially desirable for similar
reasons. However, such a ban prevents the use of pure bundling.
According to the leverage theory of tying, on which the Supreme Courts decisions
to prohibit block booking were based, tying allows a distributor to extend its monopoly
power on a desirable movie to an undesirable one. This theory was criticized by the
Chicago School (see e.g. Bowman 1957, Stigler 1963, Posner 1976, Bork 1978) since
the distributor is better o¤ by selling only the desirable movie at a higher price. As an
alternative, Stigler (1963) proposed a theory based on price discrimination which became
a dominant strand in the literature (Schmalensee, 1984, McAfee et al. 1989, Sha¤er,
1991, Salinger 1995 and Armstrong 1996), at least until Whinston (1990) resuscitated
the leverage theory with its rst formal treatment (for later work in this line, see Choi and
Stefanadis 2001, Carlton and Waldman 2002, and Nalebu¤2004). Basically, in Whinston
(1990), precommitment to pure bundling induces an incumbent to be aggressive, which
discourages entry if there is a xed cost of entry. We contribute to the literature by
showing that pure bundling of digital goods is socially desirable in terms of allocation of
slots and does not generate any concern in terms of foreclosure, absent slotting contracts.
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Since each rm can bundle any number of products in our paper, we also contribute to
the literature on bundling a large number of products. Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and
Brynjolfsson (1999) show that bundling allows a monopolist to extract more surplus since
it reduces the variance of average valuations by the law of large numbers. In our paper,
the law of large number plays no role due to the assumption of complete information.
Jeon and Menicucci (2006) consider a framework similar to the one in the current paper
to study competition among publishers selling academic journals to a library facing a
budget constraint (instead of a slot constraint). While both papers nd that each rm
has an incentive to bundle its products, Jeon and Menicucci (2006) show that bundling
reduces social welfare since if large publishers extract more surplus with bundling, there
is less (possibly zero) budget left for small publishers.
Our game when bundling is allowed is similar to the menu-auction game (Bernheim
and Whinston, 1986) and the common agency game. For instance, Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1998) and OBrien and Sha¤er (1997) consider competition between two sellers
facing a common buyer. They identify a selloutequilibrium that maximizes the joint
prot of all three players and Pareto-dominates any other equilibrium in terms of the
sellerspayo¤s. Although our model is a bit di¤erent from theirs,12 their result applies
to our setting as well. Our contribution mainly lies in analyzing independent pricing and
the incentive to use bundling, identifying two su¢ cient conditions that make all equilib-
ria e¢ cient under bundling, and comparing the outcome under independent pricing with
that under bundling.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates the key results with a simple
example. Section 3 presents the model. Sections 4 and 5 analyze independent pricing
and bundling, respectively. Section 6 studies bundling with slotting contracts. Section 7
concludes. The Appendix contains some of the proofs, but not all of them for the sake
of brevity.13
12Precisely, they assume that each seller sells a homogeneous product and thus each seller chooses
a price schedule that depends only on quantity. Our setting is more general: since each seller sells
heterogenous objects, he species a price for each subset of objects which depends not only on the
number of products, but also on their identities. In addition, they do not consider the slot constraint.
13In particular, we do not provide the proofs for Lemma 1, Proposition 5 (these results have been
previously discovered by Bernheim and Whinston (1986, 1998) and OBrien and Sha¤er (1997)), and for
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2 Illustration with a simple example
In this section we give a simple example to illustrate some of our main results. There are
two sellers, A and B. A has two products of values (u1A; u
2
A) = (4; 3), while B has one
product of value u1B = 2. u
j
i denotes the value that the buyer, C, obtains from the j-th
best product among seller is products. The values are independent but each product
needs to occupy a slot to generate a value, and C has only two slots. We consider digital
goods, which means that the production cost is zero for each product. Thus e¢ ciency
requires that the two slots be occupied by As two products.
2.1 Independent pricing
Consider a simultaneous pricing game without bundling: seller i (= A, B) simultaneously
chooses a price pji  0 for product j (= 1; 2). We assume as a tie-breaking rule that if C
is indi¤erent among several products, she buys the products with the highest values.14
Non-existence of equilibrium in pure strategies Here we prove that this game
has no equilibrium in pure strategies. First, there is no equilibrium in which A sells only
his best product. Indeed, in this case A can make a prot of 4 by setting p1A = 4 and
p2A > 3,
15 so that C buys only As best product from A. The best response of B is
p1B = 2. However, a protable deviation exists for A: by setting p
1
A = 3:9 and p
2
A = 2:9,
A succeeds in selling both products and earns 6:8 > 4.
Now we prove that there is no equilibrium in which A sells his two products. In order
to sell both products, A needs to set p1A  2 and p2A  1, otherwise B can protably sell
his own product by charging p1B > 0 such that 2  p1B > minf4  p1A; 3  p2Ag. Therefore
the prot of A when he sells both products is not larger than 3. This is inconsistent with
an equilibrium, since we know that A can earn 4 by selling only his best product.
In summary, a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist for the following reasons. On
the one hand, if A occupies both slots, each of As products faces competition from Bs
Propositions 2 and 3. These proofs can be obtained from the authors upon request.
14This tie-breaking rule is standard. See footnote 20 for more details.
15Actually, A can earn 4 also by playing p1A = 4 and p
2
A = 3. But then we cannot have an equilibrium
since there is no best reply for B.
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product such that As total prot is lower than the prot he makes from selling only his
best product. On the other hand, if A occupies only one slot, he can extract the full
surplus of C from his best product. But then, Bs best response is to do the same with
his own product, which triggers As deviation to occupy both slots.
Mixed-strategy equilibrium In this game, there exists a mixed-strategy equilib-
rium16 in which (i) A chooses p1A = p
2
A + 1 and selects p
2











if p2A 2 [32 ; 3);
1 if p2A = 3;
(ii) B chooses p1B randomly in the interval [
1
2




. In this equilibrium, As best product is always sold while As
second best product andBs product are sold with probabilities 0:46 and 0:54 respectively.
As prot is 4, Bs prot is 1/2 and the buyers payo¤ is 1.96.
2.2 Bundling
Suppose now that A o¤ers only a bundle of his two products at a price PA  0. Let
PB  0 denote the price that B charges for his product. In this game, the unique
equilibrium is PA = 5, PB = 0 and C buys As bundle; hence the outcome is e¢ cient. It
is easy to see why this is an equilibrium: A has no incentive to charge PA > 5, as then C
prefers buying Bs product instead of As bundle. Given that Bs prot is zero for any
PB  0, it follows that PB = 0 is a best response.
Although this example is simple, it generates useful insights. First, it shows that a
rm may have a strict incentive to use bundling since it prevents the rms own products
from competing with each other and thereby reduces the damage caused from the rivals
product(s). If A wants to occupy both slots, under independent pricing, he needs to
charge an aggressive price for the second product (i.e. p2A = 1) and this forces him to
reduce also p1A to 2 because C has an option to buy only one product from A and to ll
the second slot with Bs product. Bundling eliminates this option and thereby prevents
As own products from competing with each other.
16See Section 4.2 for a general analysis of a mixed strategy equilibrium in the case of two slots.
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What happens here can also be interpreted from the point of view of cooperative
game theory.17 If A attempts to sell both of his products, then the price for each product
is limited by the added value of the product with respect to the product of B, that is
p1A  4   2 = 2 and p2A  3   2 = 1. On the other hand, when As products are sold
as a bundle, the price of the bundle is limited by the added value of the bundle with
respect to the product of B, i.e. PA  4 + 3   2 = 5, and the value of Bs product is
subtracted only once. In the terms of cooperative game theory, the coalition composed
by the bundle of As products has an added value of 5, which is higher than the sum of
the added values (2 + 1) of each individual product of A.
Second, bundling restores equilibrium in pure strategies without causing ine¢ ciency.
The intuition for e¢ ciency is simple in the case of digital goods with independent values.
In this case, e¢ ciency requires the best k products to occupy the k slots. Suppose that
one of the k best products does not occupy any slot. Then, its seller can increase his
prot by including it in his bundle or, if not currently selling any bundle to the buyer,
by providing the product on its own.
Finally, the buyers surplus can be larger under bundling than under independent
pricing. Indeed, the buyers payo¤ is 2 under bundling, while she obtains 1.96 in the
mixed-strategy equilibrium under independent pricing. This occurs because the mixed-
strategy equilibrium does not implement the e¢ cient allocation of slots with probabil-
ity one, and therefore a lower social surplus is generated. As well, under independent
pricing, competition is softer in the mixed-strategy equilibrium than in the candidate
pure-strategy equilibrium (see Proposition 1) since A randomizes between selling both
products and only the best product, and B responds to this by being less aggressive.
3 The Model
3.1 The setting
We consider two competing sellers (or rms), denoted by A and B; the extension to
competition among more than two sellers can be done similarly. There is a single buyer,
17We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the interpretation.
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denoted by C. We use he for each seller i (rm i) with i = A;B and she for the
buyer. Each rm i has a portfolio Bi of ni  1 distinct products and we use bi to
represent a generic product in Bi. Let B  BA [ BB. We assume that the prototypes
of all the products in B have already been produced before the rms engage in price
competition. In other words, any xed cost related to producing the rst unit of each
product has already been incurred. For any Bi  Bi, let Ci(Bi) represent the cost for
rm i of producing one unit of every product in Bi, with Ci() = 0. We assume that
for any product the marginal cost is non-negative: given bi 2 Bi and Bi  Bi such that
bi =2 Bi, we have Ci(Bi [ fbig)  Ci(Bi). Given any B  B, let BA  BA and BB  BB
be such that B = BA [ BB and dene C(B) as CA(BA) + CB(BB). We say that the
products are digital goods if C(B) = 0 for any B  B:
The buyer has a unit demand for each product. For any set of products B  B,
let U(B) represent the gross value that C obtains from using B. We assume U() = 0
and that for any product in B, the marginal gross value is non-negative. Let V (B) =
U(B)  C(B) denote the social welfare for the economy composed of the buyer and the
two rms when the rms produce B  B and C uses every product in B.
Since we are mainly interested in studying the e¤ect of the buyers slot constraint
on the competition between the two rms, we assume that C has k  1 slots and a
product needs to occupy any slot to generate any value.18 Therefore, if C buys B  B
and #(B)  k then her gross payo¤ is given by U(B); if instead #(B) > k, then her
gross payo¤ is given by maxU(B̂) subject to B̂  B and #(B̂)  k. The buyers net
payo¤ from buying B is given by her gross payo¤ as described above minus the prices
paid.
We have in mind a situation in which the two multi-product rms A and B compete
in several separate markets. In each market, there is a single buyer and the rms charge
di¤erent prices in each di¤erent market. Therefore, without loss of generality we can
consider only one market (and only one buyer).
A special case of this setting is the case of independent products, which we now in-
18By assuming unit demand, we assume for simplicity that a product can occupy at most one slot in
that the value generated from occupying a second unit of slot is zero. This assumption can be relaxed
without changing the main results.
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troduce. For any product bi 2 Bi, let u(bi) = U(fbig) represent the gross value generated
by this product when C does not buy anything else. We say that values are independent







u(bB) for any BA  BA and BB  BB:
For any product bi 2 Bi, let ci(bi) = Ci(fbig) represent the cost for rm i of producing
one unit of the product when rm i does not produce anything else. We say that costs




ci(bi) for any Bi  Bi and for i = A;B:
The case of independent products is such that both values and costs are independent.
For this setting, let v(bi)  u(bi)  ci(bi) denote the net value of product bi.
We study how the rmspricing strategies (in particular, bundling or not) a¤ect the
set of products occupying the buyers slots. Specically, we are interested in knowing
when the slots are occupied by the products that maximize social welfare, dened by
B  argmax
BB
V (B) subject to #(B)  k: (1)
We assume that B is unique and we let V   U(B) C(B) and Bi  B\Bi. We say
that an equilibrium (of the games we consider below) is (socially) e¢ cient if the rms
produce the set B, or a set B such that B  B and C(B) = C(B), and each product
in B occupies a slot.
An important role is played by the products that maximize social welfare when C is
restricted to buying from a single rm i = A;B, dened by
BSi  arg max
BiBi
V (Bi) subject to #(Bi)  k: (2)
We assume that BSi is unique and we let V
S
i  U(BSi )  Ci(BSi ).
We make the following assumption.
Assumption A1.
BA 6= ;, V SB > 0, V SA + V SB   V   0:
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The condition BA 6= ; means that the e¢ cient allocation includes some products of rm
A; this is without loss of generality. The inequality V SB > 0 means that if C is restricted
to dealing only with rm B, then there exist mutually protable trades; if V SB  0, then
A does not face any competition from B. Finally, the assumption V SA + V
S
B   V   0
means that the products of the two rms are substitutes in a weak sense and guarantees
that there exists an e¢ cient equilibrium (see Section 5.2).
3.2 Contracts and games
In this section, we rst describe the bilateral contracts that each seller can propose to
the buyer in our model and then introduce the timing of the games that we study.
3.2.1 Menu of bundles (without slotting contracts)
In the absence of slotting contracts, dened in Section 6, the most general contract
between seller i and the buyer is that i o¤ers a menu of bundles with a price Pi(Bi)  0
for each bundle Bi  Bi, such that Pi() = 0.19 Then, if C buys bundle BA from
rm A and bundle BB from rm B (some of these sets may be empty), then she pays
PA(BA) + PB(BB). Let si = fPi(Bi)gBiBi denote a generic strategy of rm i.
 Technology-renting
A particular menu of bundles is what we call technology-renting, which Bernheim and
Whinston (1998) refer to as a sellout contract. A technology-renting strategy for rm i
is characterized by a fee Fi  0 and is such that Pi(Bi) = Fi+Ci(Bi) for any non-empty
Bi  Bi. In words, if the buyer wants to buy at least one product from rm i, then she
must rst pay Fi for the right to buy, and in addition she pays the production cost of
the products that she selects to buy. In a sense, rm i rents his production technology
to C by levying a xed rental fee in addition to a term for cost reimbursement. Let tri
denote a generic technology-renting strategy of rm i.
19Our denition of menu of bundles generalizes the notion of mixed bundling used in the context of
two goods (see McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) for example). In this case, mixed bundling
means that the seller charges a price for each good and a third price for the bundle of both goods.
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Note that if i plays a technology-renting strategy with fee Fi, then is prot is Fi if
C buys at least one of is products and zero otherwise. Furthermore, if both rms play a
technology-renting strategy and C rents both technologies, then she becomes the residual
claimant of social welfare, which induces her to buy the e¢ cient set B.
 Pure bundling
A pure bundling strategy is such that Pi(Bi) = Fi for some Fi  0 for any non-empty
Bi  Bi. Therefore each subset of Bi is o¤ered by rm i at the same price Fi, which
in a sense makes pure bundling an all-or-nothing deal. Pure bundling is equivalent to
technology-renting in the case of digital goods.
 Independent pricing
An independent pricing strategy is such that rm i chooses an individual price pi(bi)
for each bi in Bi and the price for any non-empty Bi  Bi is Pi(Bi) =
P
bi2Bi pi(bi).
In what follows, we use the word bundlingfor any pricing strategy that is di¤erent
from independent pricing. When bundling is prohibited, each rm is constrained to using
independent pricing. When bundling is allowed, each rm can use any menu of bundles
including independent pricing.
3.2.2 Timing
We consider a two-stage pricing game in which
 at stage one, each rm simultaneously makes a contract o¤er;
 at stage two, C chooses the products (or bundles) to buy and allocates the slots.
At stage two, we assume that in case C is indi¤erent among di¤erent combinations
of products, she chooses the combination that maximizes social welfare.20
20This tie-breaking rule is standard in that it is basically equivalent to the following rule applied in a
Bertrand setting when two rms produce a homogenous good with di¤erent marginal costs: when the
two rms charge the same price, the tie is broken by assuming that all consumers buy from the rm
with the lower marginal cost (which generates a higher social welfare).
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4 Independent pricing
In this section, we assume that rms are restricted to using independent pricing and
focus on the case of independent products when there are more than k products with
positive net value.21 Then B is the set of the k products with the highest net values.
We order the products in BA and BB such that v(b1A)  v(b2A)  :::  v(b
nA
A ) and
v(b1B)  v(b2B)  :::  v(b
nB
B ). Firms A and B select the prices fpA(bA)gbA2BA and
fpB(bB)gbB2BB . Let wi(bi)  u(bi)  pi(bi) represent the net surplus that C obtains from
buying product bi. Therefore she buys the k products with the highest net surpluses,
provided that these surpluses are non-negative.
4.1 Equilibrium in pure strategies
We rst study equilibrium in pure strategies. Given that BA 6= ;, we distinguish the case
of BB 6= ; from the case of BB = ; (which implies B = BA).
When BB 6= ;, an important role is played by the product with the highest net
value among the products in BnB (that is, the product b such that v(b)  v(bi) for any
bi 2 BnB). We suppose that such a product is unique and that it belongs to BA (since
Bi 6= ; for i = A;B, this is without loss of generality). Let bA denote this best product
in BnB and note that v(bA) > 0 since there are more than k products with positive net
value.
For the case of BB = ;, we dene (bB) = minfu(bB); v(b1B)g for bB = b2B; :::; b
nB
B .
Thus, for each bB 2 BBnfb1Bg, (bB) is the minimum between the gross value of bB and
the net value of b1B (we explain later in this section why (bB) plays a role whenB

B = ;.)22
In order to simplify the exposition, we suppose that u(b2B)  u(b3B)  :::  u(b
nB
B ), which
implies that (b2B)  (b3B)  :::  (b
nB
B ). In fact, this assumption is without loss of
generality since the order of net values in BBnfb1Bg is irrelevant when BB = ;.
21If there are  k products with positive net value, then each rm i can extract the full surplus from
the buyer by charging pi(bi) = maxfu(bi); ci(bi)g for any bi 2 Bi. The assumption that more than k
products have positive net value creates competition among the products.
22We use this denition of (bB) becuase we allow for prices below marginal cost. If conversely we




Proposition 1 [independent pricing: pure strategies] Suppose that products are indepen-
dent, that there are more than k products with positive net value and that each rm uses
independent pricing.
(i) If an equilibrium in pure strategies exists, then it is e¢ cient and there exists a number
w such that wi(bi) = w for any bi 2 B; moreover, w = maxf0;maxbi2(BnB)fwi(bi)gg.
(ii) When BB 6= ;, if an equilibrium in pure strategies exists, then w  v(bA). In
addition, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists if
v(bA) > u(bB) for any bB 2 BBnBB: (3)







[v(bA)  (bk j+1B )] for j = 1; :::; k   1: (4)
Proposition 1(i) describes some properties of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE)
under independent pricing. In any NE (if it exists), the slots are occupied by the products
in B, and the net surpluses of these products are all equal to a common value w, which
is the highest net surplus (if positive) among the products in BnB.
When BB 6= ;, the rst part of Proposition 1(ii) reveals that a multi-product rm
su¤ers from internal competition (i.e., competition among its own products) under in-
dependent pricing, in that A needs to leave C a net surplus at least equal to v(bA) on
any product he sells, even though A himself owns bA. In other words, in any NE each
product in BA must give the buyer at least as much surplus as it would give when the
best product in BnB is o¤ered at cost by another rm. This occurs because if w in
Proposition 1(i) is smaller than v(bA), then B prices each product bB in BB such that
wB(bB) = w
 < v(bA), and this in turn allows A to nd a protable deviation that induces
C to replace a product in BB with bA by setting pA(bA) between cA(bA) and u(bA) w.23
For this reason, no NE exists if (3) holds. In order to see why, it is useful to consider the
case of digital goods. Then, v(bA) = u(bA) > wA(bA) for each bA 2 (BAnBA), bA 6= bA and
(3) implies that v(bA) = u(bA) > wB(bB) for each bB 2 (BBnBB). Since w  v(bA) > 0
and w = maxbi2(BnB)fwi(bi)g from Proposition 1(i), pA(bA) = 0 and w = v(bA) must
hold. However, A has an incentive to relax the internal competition by slightly increasing
23Simultaneously, A needs to decrease slightly the prices of his products in BA.
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pA(bA) above zero, in order to extract more surplus from each product in BA. This leads
to w = w(bA) < v(bA), and we have seen that w < v(bA) cannot hold in NE. It is worth
noting that in the case of digital goods, condition (3) is satised as long as products have
heterogeneous values. Therefore, NE non-existence generically holds for digital goods
when BB 6= ;.24 The next example illustrates this result.
Example 1 Consider a setting of digital goods with independent values, BA = fb1A; b2Ag,
BB = fb1Bg, k = 2 and u(b1A) = 4, u(b2A) = 2, u(b1B) = 3; thus B = fb1A; b1Bg, bA = b2A and
(3) holds (trivially, since BBnBB = ;). On the one hand, there exists no NE in which C
buys fb1A; b2Ag since B can protably induce C to replace b2A with b1B. On the other hand,
there exists no NE in which C buys fb1A; b1Bg because then 4   p1A = 3   p1B = w (from
Proposition 1(i)) and (i) if w < 2, then A can protably induce C to replace b1B with
b2A by choosing p
2
A = 2   w   " > 0 ; (ii) if w  2, then A can protably deviate by
charging p1A = 4 and p
2
A  2.
When BB = ;, every product in BA must give C a net surplus w such that w 
v(b1B); otherwise a protable deviation exists for B. However, A might have an incentive
to deviate by occupying less than k slots. Actually, As optimization problem for the
number of slots to occupy given the prices charged by B is similar to a standard monopoly
pricing problem under a downward sloping demand: the fewer slots A occupies, the
higher is the surplus per slot he extracts. To provide an intuition, consider digital goods
and assume that B charges zero price for all his products (we explain below in this
paragraph why this minimizes As incentive to deviate). Then, As deviation to occupy
k   1 slots is protable if (k   1)(u(b1B)   u(b2B)) > u(bkA)   u(b1B) holds: A extracts
more surplus, by u(b1B)   u(b2B), from each of k   1 products sold but loses the prot
u(bkA)  u(b1B) from the k-th (unsold) product. More generally, minimizing As incentive
to deviate requires (i) minimizing the value of w, which implies w = v(b1B) and A =P
bA2BA
[v(bA)  v(b1B)]; and (ii) maximizing the net surpluses of the products b2B; :::; b
nB
B
subject to the constraint wB(bB)  v(b1B) for bB = b2B; :::; b
nB
B . This leads to (bB) as
24Likewise, if we impose pi(bi)  ci(bi) for any bi 2 B, then the condition v(bA) > wB(bB) for each
bB 2 (BBnBB) holds as long as net values are heterogeneous. Thus, NE non-existence generically holds
if prices cannot be below costs.
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dened above for bB = b2B; :::; b
nB
B , and if A wants to sell the bundle fb1A; b2A; :::; b
j
Ag for






[v(bA)  (bk j+1B )]. We obtain (4) by comparing this deviation
prot with A.
From Proposition 1, we obtain the following corollary for the case of digital goods.
Corollary 1 In the case of digital goods with independent values, under independent
pricing, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium if either of the two following conditions
holds:
(i) BB 6= ; and products have heterogenous values;
(ii) BB = ; and
P
bA2BA





[u(bA)   u(bk j+1B )] holds for
at least one j between 1 and k   1.
4.2 Mixed strategies
In this section, we study equilibrium in mixed strategies in the simple setting of digital
goods with k = 2, and then we provide a general result on the ine¢ ciency of mixed
strategy NE.
When k = 2, without loss of generality we consider nA = nB = 2. For notational
simplicity we let x = u(b1A), y = u(b
2
A), z = u(b
1
B), t = u(b
2
B), and with some abuse of






B. Firm A charges prices
(px; py) and B charges (pz; pt). Assume without loss of generality that t is the lowest
valued product. If values are heterogeneous, then there are two possible cases:
 case 1: z > x > y > t or x > z > y > t;
 case 2: x > y > z > t:
In case 1, there exists no pure-strategy NE by Corollary 1(i), while in case 2 Proposi-
tion 1(iii) reveals that a pure-strategy NE exists if and only if y  2z t. If the inequality
holds, the NE is px = x  z, py = y  z, pz = pt = 0. Therefore, we assume y < 2z  t for
case 2; this inequality is automatically satised in case 1. The next proposition describes
a mixed-strategy NE:
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Proposition 2 [independent pricing: mixed strategies] Consider the setting, described
just above, of digital goods with k = 2 and y < 2z   t. Suppose that each rm uses
independent pricing.
(i) There exists a mixed-strategy NE in which A sets px = x , py = y  and randomly
chooses  in the interval [t; 1
2
(y + t)] according to the c.d.f. GA() =
2z t y
2z 2 (note that
GA has an atom at  = t) and B sets pz = z   , pt = 0 and randomly chooses  in the
interval [t; 1
2
(y + t)] according to the c.d.f. GB() =
 t
y  .





The buyer buys either the combination fx; yg or fx; zg.25 For y  z+(z  t)=3, GB rst
order stochastically dominates GA, that is on average B leaves C more surplus than A
does.
The strategies described in Proposition 2(i) can be easily interpreted as follows. A
randomly selects a net surplus  for each of his products (which means that px = x  ,
py = y   ) in [; ] = [t; 12(y + t)] according to the c.d.f. GA() =
2z t y
2z 2 ; B chooses







(y + t)] according to the c.d.f. GB() =
 t
y  . The outcome of
this NE is such that the buyer always buys product x, never buys product t and buys
either product y or z depending on the realization of the mixed strategies.
In order to get an intuition for this mixed strategy NE, consider case 1 and note that
B = fx; zg and bA = y. If a pure-strategy NE existed, then x  px = z   pz = y [as we
argued when providing the intuition for Proposition 1(ii)], and A = x  y, B = z   y;
this corresponds to  = y,  = y. However, rm A has an incentive to increase py above
zero in order to reduce the internal competition generated by product y and to sell good
x at a higher price. In fact, A can always earn x   t (> x   y) by setting px = x   t,
py = y   t; this corresponds to  = t. Then B also gains from reducing  to t since he
earns z   t instead of z   y. However, at  =  = t rm A can increase his prot by
slightly increasing  above t to sell both products and earn about x + y   2t > x   t,
25The probability that C buys fx; yg turns out to be y t2(y z)2 [y   z + (2z   t  y) ln
2z t y
z t ]. For the
example in Section 2, the parameters are x = 4; y = 3; z = 2; t = 0. Then the support for  and  is
[0; 32 ] and GA() =
1
4 2 , GB() =

3  . From 4   px = 3   py =  and pz = z    we obtain FA and
FB described in Section 2.1. The probability that C buys fx; yg is 32 (1 + ln
1
2 ) ' 0:46.
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only to trigger an analogous reaction from B. Therefore, it is not surprising that we nd
a mixed strategy NE in which   t and   t with probability one. However, the upper
bound for , , coincides with the upper bound for , . It is not equal to y but is such
that A earns x t by selling both products at the lowest prices px = x  and py = y ,
i.e. x + y   2 = x   t or  = 1
2
(y + t). Hence A chooses  between t and 1
2
(y + t),
which means that he is less aggressive than when playing  = y as in the candidate
pure-strategy NE. That is, A reduces the competition that product y exerts on product





instead of z   y.
It is also interesting to note that when y  z + (z   t)=3, we nd that B is more
aggressive than A in the sense that GB rst order stochastically dominates GA, and thus
B leaves on average more surplus than A does. For this reason, for instance, when y is
close to z, C buys product y (respectively, z) with probability about 1=4 (respectively,
3=4). The intuition for this result is that leaving a high surplus on product y reduces the
prot that A makes from x, which C certainly buys.
The mixed-strategy NE described by Proposition 2 is ine¢ cient, as C buys B with
probability smaller than 1. More generally, we can prove that a similar property holds
when the conditions for non-existence of a pure-strategy NE in Proposition 1 are satised:
in such a case, no mixed-strategy NE is e¢ cient, independently of k and of whether or
not the products are digital goods.
Proposition 3 Suppose that BB 6= ; and (3) is satised or that BB 6= ; and (4) is
violated. Then, no pure-strategy NE exists and any mixed-strategy NE is ine¢ cient.
If no pure-strategy NE exists, then one (or more) mixed-strategy NE may exist. But
each mixed-strategy NE is ine¢ cient according to Proposition 3. This is consistent with
Proposition 2 (and footnote 25) and implies that under a broad set of circumstances, nei-
ther e¢ cient pure-strategy NE nor e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists under independent
pricing.
The logic behind Proposition 3 is quite simple. If an e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE
exists, then it is necessary that C buy all products in B with probability one, which
requires that wi(bi)  wj(bj) with probability one for each bi 2 B and bj 2 BnB. But
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then for each product bi 2 B, it is protable for i to choose a deterministic pi(bi) such
that wi(bi) is equal to the lowest value that, with probability one, is weakly larger than
wj(bj) for each bj 2 BnB. In a sense, this brings us back to the pure-strategy setting
and allows to use the arguments of Proposition 1 to show that an e¢ cient mixed-strategy
NE does not exist.
5 Bundling
In this section, we study competition among sellers when bundling is allowed. We show
that each seller has an incentive to bundle his products (Section 5.1), that an e¢ cient
equilibrium always exists (Section 5.2), and we provide su¢ cient conditions for all equi-
libria to be e¢ cient (Section 5.3). Finally, we compare the case of independent pricing
with that of bundling in terms of social welfare and the buyers surplus (Section 5.4).
We would like to emphasize that even though we focus on the slot constraint, all
the principles underlying our results hold independently of this constraint. Thus, we can
think of the role of the slot constraint as creating competition among products even when
they have independent values and costs.
5.1 Incentive to bundle
We rst describe an important property of the technology-renting strategies in the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 1 [Bernheim and Whinston, 1986]26 For any prole of strategies (sA; sB), let i
denote the prot of rm i given (sA; sB). Then rm i can also make prot i by playing
a technology-renting strategy, instead of si, in which the xed fee Fi is equal to i.
Lemma 1 says that no rm i loses anything by restricting attention to technology-
renting strategies regardless of the strategies used by the other rm. We will often use
this result in our proofs. In particular, the lemma implies that each rm has at least a
26Technology-renting strategies are analogous to truthful strategies in Bernheim and Whinston
(1986) and Lemma 1 in our paper is analogous to Theorem 1 in their paper.
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weak incentive to practice bundling. Furthermore, the example in Section 2 illustrates a
case in which a rm has a strict incentive to do so. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 4 [incentive to bundle] Each rm has at least a weak incentive, and some-
times a strict incentive, to practice bundling.
5.2 An e¢ cient equilibrium
In this section we describe an e¢ cient equilibrium. In this NE each rm i uses a
technology-renting strategy and hence we can consider the strategy space for each i
as given by [0;+1), the set of possible values of Fi. The equilibrium xed fees are
F A = V
   V SB , F B = V    V SA : (5)
The intuition for these values is simple. If C rents only js technology, then she chooses
Bj  Bj to maximize U(Bj)   Fj   Cj(Bj) subject to #(Bj)  k and obtains payo¤
V Sj   Fj: see (2). If she rents is technology as well, then she becomes the residual
claimant over social welfare, thus chooses B and obtains a payo¤ equal to V  Fj  Fi.
Therefore, the Fi that makes C indi¤erent between renting is technology (in addition to
renting js technology) and not renting the technology is equal to V    V Sj .27 Actually,
V  V Sj represents the incremental contribution to social welfare made by the products
in Bi or, in the terms of Brandenburger and Stuart (1996), the added value of rm i.28
Note that if BB = ;, then V  = V SA and therefore F B = 0.
Let tri denote the technology-renting strategy of rm i in which the xed fee is F

i .
As discovered by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and OBrien and Sha¤er (1997) (for a
somewhat di¤erent model: see footnote 12), the prole (trA; tr

B) is a NE, which we call
the technology-renting equilibrium.
27This intuition may appear incomplete as it assumes that C has already rented the technology of j,
but actually it is simple to see that there exists no NE in which C rents no technology. To be precise, a
protable deviation for any rm i is such that i plays a technology-renting strategy with a small positive
Fi, given that V Si > 0.
28Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) apply a similar idea to dene the added value of a rm in a vertical
chain as the value created by all agents in the chain minus the value created by the same agents without
the rm in question.
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Proposition 5 [Bernheim and Whinston, 1998 and/or OBrien and Sha¤er 1997, technology-
renting equilibrium and e¢ ciency when BB = ;] Suppose that bundling is allowed.
(i) There exists an e¢ cient NE in which each rm i uses the technology-renting strategy




B in (5) and the buyers payo¤ is 

C 
V SA + V
S
B   V   0.
(ii) In any NE, the prot of each rm i is not larger than F i ; hence, the technology-
renting equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium in terms of sellerspayo¤s.
(iii) All equilibria are e¢ cient if BB = ;.
The logic for Proposition 5(i) is straightforward. If the rms play (trA; tr

B), then
C obtains the same payo¤ from renting only As technology, or only Bs technology, or
both technologies. The tie-breaking rule selects the alternative that maximizes social
welfare and thus C rents both technologies and selects the products in B, meaning that
the NE is e¢ cient.29 Note that the payo¤ of C, C , is non-negative by assumption A1.
Moreover, if rm A (for instance) increases FA above F A, then C strictly prefers renting
only Bs technology to renting only As technology or both technologies. The intuition
for Proposition 5(ii) is that if rm i attempts to make a prot larger than the incremental
contribution of his portfolio Bi to social welfare, then j can nd a protable deviation
by inducing C to buy only BSj .
Furthermore, according to Proposition 5(iii), all NE are e¢ cient if BB = ;. In words,
if the e¢ cient allocation requires C to use only products of rm A, then any NE induces
the e¢ cient allocation. The result is from OBrien and Sha¤er (1997) and its idea is
simple. If C purchases an ine¢ cient bundle, then an ine¢ ciently low social surplus
V (< V ) is generated whereas A and C can jointly generate a surplus equal to V .
Therefore if A plays a technology-renting strategy with fee equal to A (his prot before
the deviation), C can increase her payo¤ by V   V by trading only with A; hence A can
charge a fee slightly higher than A and still induce C to rent As technology.
However, OBrien and Sha¤er (1997) also show that non-linear pricing (i.e., bundling
in our setting) can generate ine¢ cient NE when BB 6= ;. Similarly, the following example
29The technology-renting equilibrium generalizes the marginal cost pricing result in the literature on
competition in non-linear pricing (Armstrong and Vickers, 2001, 2010 and Rochet and Stole 2002) to a
situation in which each rm can produce any number of distinct products.
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shows that pure bundling generates an ine¢ cient NE.
Example 2 (pure bundling and ine¢ ciency) Consider a setting with independent prod-
ucts and k = 2. Firm A has two products: BA = fb1A; b2Ag such that u(b1A) = 12,
u(b2A) = 8. Firm B has two products: BB = fb1B; b2Bg such that u(b1B) = 10, u(b2B) = 5.
The marginal production cost for each product is 3. Then there exists a NE in which
rm A plays pure bundling by charging FA = 11 for each subset of BA, and B charges
PB(b
1
B) = 5, PB(b
2




B) = 6. Then C buys BA even though B = fb1A; b1Bg
includes a product of B.
In the NE of Example 2, rm B is unable to sell his superior product b1B for the two
following reasons. First, from the all-or-nothing deal of pure bundling, if C buys b1A, she
also gets b2A at the same total price. Second, if rm B tries to nd a protable deviation,
in order not to make a loss he must charge a price for b1B at least equal to the marginal
cost 3, whereas the gain of C from replacing b2A with b
1
B is 10  8 = 2.
This argument suggests that the ine¢ cient NE would disappear if the marginal cost
of b1B were smaller than 2. In the next subsection we prove that this is indeed the case
and provide general su¢ cient conditions to make all NE e¢ cient.
5.3 Conditions under which all equilibria are e¢ cient
In this subsection, we provide two (di¤erent) mild conditions guaranteeing that all NEs
are e¢ cient regardless of whether BB 6= ; holds; note that both conditions are satised
in the case of independent products. More precisely, when either of the two conditions
holds, all NEs are e¢ cient if the products are digital goods, or if sales below marginal cost
are banned. Furthermore, under the rst condition, each seller i can earn F i regardless of




In this section we consider a class of environments which satisfy a condition related to
submodularity. Given any B  B, we dene V m(B) as follows:
V m(B)  max
B̂B
V (B̂) subject to #(B̂)  k;
where the superscript m comes from the max operator. In the next proposition, we
assume that V m satises the following property:
V m(Bj [Bi) V m(Bj)  V m(Bj [Bi) V m(Bj) for any Bj  Bj and i 6= j = A;B: (6)
In order to understand (6), it is useful to recall the standard property of decreasing
marginal values:
V m(B[fbg) V m(B)  V m(B0[fbg) V m(B0) for any B0  B  B and b 2 BnB; (7)
which is well known to be equivalent to submodularity of V m (see Moulin (1995)). Con-
dition (6) is implied by (7) and has a related interpretation: the incremental social
contribution of Bi given Bj is weakly smaller than the one given Bj, for any Bj  Bj.
But in fact, (6) is substantially weaker than (7) and for this reason we call condition (6)
weak m-submodularity.30
In this class of environments, a strong result is obtained for digital goods, or when
each rm is prohibited from setting the marginal price of any product below its marginal
cost. Precisely, we consider the following restriction on rm is strategies:
for any bi 2 Bi and any Bi  Bi such that bi =2 Bi,
Pi(Bi [ fbig)  Pi(Bi)  Ci(Bi [ fbig)  Ci(Bi) for i = A;B.
(8)
The meaning of (8) is that as the number of products in a bundle of rm i increases, the
price of the bundle needs to increase at least by the cost of the additional products in the
bundle. In short, the marginal price of each product is not smaller than its marginal cost.
In particular, this implies that Pi(Bi)  Ci(Bi) for each Bi  Bi, or pricing above total
cost. In addition, if seller i is interested in selling a particular bundle Bi for a certain
price P   0, condition (8) forces him to o¤er each subset of Bi at a price (weakly)
30Notice that weak m-submodularity implies that the last inequality in A1 is satised.
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smaller than P  such that the buyer can save at least Ci(Bi) Ci(Binfbig) by cancelling
a product bi in Bi. In particular, (8) makes it impossible for a rm to use a pure bundling
strategy except in the case of digital goods, and indeed the rmsstrategies (the strategy
of rm A, in particular) in the NE of Example 2 violate (8). On the other hand, every
technology-renting strategy satises (8). Therefore, from Lemma 1 we know that for any
sj, rm i(6= j) can nd a best response to sj in the set of strategies satisfying (8).
Proposition 6 [uniqueness of equilibrium outcome under weak m-submodularity] Sup-
pose that bundling is allowed and that weak m-submodularity condition (6) holds. Con-
sider either the setting of digital goods or assume that sales below marginal cost are banned
(i.e., (8) must be satised). Then
(i) each rm i can earn F i by using the technology-renting strategy with fee F

i , indepen-
dently of the pricing strategy chosen by rm j;
(ii) all NEs are outcome-equivalent, i.e. in each NE the allocation of slots is e¢ cient and
each player obtains the same payo¤: F A; F

B for the sellers and 

C for the buyer.
Proposition 6(i) says that in the case of digital goods or when sales belowmarginal cost
are prohibited, any rm can guarantee a payo¤ equal to that of the technology-renting
equilibrium F i independently of the pricing strategy played by the rival rm. In other
words, from Proposition 5(ii) we know that the upper bound of is equilibrium prot is F i ,
whereas Proposition 6(i) provides su¢ cient conditions to make this upper bound a lower
bound. The intuition for this result is especially simple to convey for the case of digital
goods. Consider rm A and note rst that F A = V
   V SB = V m(BA [ BB)   V m(BB),
i.e. F A is the marginal value of BA for the buyer when she already owns BB. Weak m-
submodularity implies that F A is smaller than the marginal value of BA when C already
owns any other bundle BB in BB. Suppose now that A plays the technology-renting
strategy with fee F A. Then A fails to earn F

A only if C refuses to rent As technology,
and in such a case C will buy some bundle BB (possibly BB = ;) from seller B. However,
for any BB, it is at least weakly protable for C to rent As technology at the price of
F A, since the marginal value of BA is at least F A. Therefore no strategy played by B can
prevent A from earning F A.
Propositions 5(ii) and 6(i) imply that each rm i earns exactly F i in any NE. Then,
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we can prove that Cs payo¤ is C in any NE, as in the technology-renting NE. If C earns
less than C , then any seller i can make a protable deviation by inducing C to buy only
Bi, since trading only with seller i generates a surplus of V Si = F i + C . Finally, since




C is equal to V
, we conclude that any NE is e¢ cient.
In the case of independent products, weak m-submodularity is satised, thus from
Propositions 5 and 6 we obtain the following corollary.




B) is an e¢ cient NE, all equilibria are e¢ cient if B

B = ;, and in any NE the
prot of each rm i is not larger than F i ;
(ii) if sales below marginal cost are banned or products are digital goods, then each rm i
can earn F i independently of the strategy of rm j, and all NEs are outcome-equivalent.
5.3.2 Unilateral improvement
Dene Um(B) as maxB̂B U(B̂) subject to #(B̂)  k. The second class of environments
we consider is characterized by a condition which we call unilateral improvement and is
described as follows:31
for every set B that is ine¢ cient, there exists B0 such that
#B0  k, B0i  Bi for some rm i and U(B0)  C(B0) > Um(B)  C(B).
(9)
The interpretation of the condition is that starting from any ine¢ cient bundle B(=
Bi [ Bj), there exists at least a seller j who can propose B0j such that a higher social
welfare is achieved if C combines B0j with a suitable subset of Bi. In this sense, there is a
way for seller j to unilaterally improve social welfare upon set B; this eventually allows
him to achieve a higher prot. The condition is satised by independent products.
In order to facilitate the understanding of condition (9), we below provide two exam-
ples.
Example 3 Consider a setting with digital goods, BA = fb1Ag, BB = fb1B; b2Bg, k = 232
31We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this condition.
























In this environment B = fb1A; b1Bg. In order to see that (9) is satised, consider for
instance B = fb1B; b2Bg. Then B0 = fb1A; b1Bg satises (9) and in particular B0B = fb1Bg
is a subset of BB = fb1B; b2Bg; an analogous argument applies to B = fb1A; b2Bg. When
B = fb1Ag or B = fb1Bg, we can pick again B0 = fb1A; b1Bg; and when B = fb2Bg we can
pick B0 = fb1A; b2Bg.
































In order to see that in this environment (9) is violated, consider B = fb1A; b1Bg. In order
to satisfy U(B0)   C(B0) > Um(B)   C(B), B0 needs to include fb2A; b2Bg, but then B0A
includes b2A and thus is not a subset of BA = fb1Ag. Likewise, B0B includes b2B and thus is
not a subset of BB = fb1Bg. In words, increasing social welfare from set B requires new
products from both rms and therefore (9) fails to hold since no seller can unilaterally
improve upon set B.
We now state an e¢ ciency result which relies on (9).
Proposition 7 [e¢ ciency under unilateral improvement] Suppose that bundling is al-
lowed and that unilateral improvement condition (9) holds. Consider either the setting
of digital goods, or assume that sales belowmarginal cost are banned (i.e., (8) must be
satised). Then all equilibria are e¢ cient.
In order to provide an intuition for this result, suppose that initially the rms play
strategies such that C buys set B with B 6= B and let B0 satisfy (9) with B0B  BB,
for instance. Then consider now that A deviates with a technology-renting strategy
specifying FA = A + ", where A is As prot before the deviation and " > 0 is close to
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zero. If C purchases only products from seller B, then her payo¤ cannot be higher than
before As deviation, whereas if she buys B0A; B
0
B, we can prove that her payo¤ is higher
than before the deviation. This implies that B0A 6= ; and that C buys some product(s) of
A, even though she may not buy the bundle B0A; B
0
B. Hence, As deviation is protable.
Precisely, if C buys B0A and B
0
B, then (i) social welfare increases by V (B
0) V (B) > 0;
(ii) the prot of A increases by "; (iii) the prot of seller B does not increase, since (8)
implies that PB(B0B)   CB(B0B)  PB(BB)   CB(BB). As a consequence, the payo¤ of
C increases at least by V (B0)   V (B)   " > 0, where " could be any number smaller
than V (B0)  V (B). The key of this argument is that cancelling the products in BBnB0B
allows C to save at least the marginal cost of these products and therefore the increase
in social welfare is split only between A and C.
We note that condition (9) delivers a weaker result than condition (6) does since
Proposition 6 determines how the social surplus V  is split among the rms and C, but
Proposition 7 does not. Nevertheless, there are no relationships between these conditions
in the sense that (9) does not imply (6),33 and that (6) does not imply (9) either.34
Propositions 6(ii) and 7 generate the following policy implications when a mild con-
dition (either weak m-submodularity or unilateral improvement) is satised. First, in
the case of digital goods, when bundling (in the sense of a menu of bundles) is allowed,
the e¢ cient allocation is always achieved. Furthermore, pure bundling is equivalent to
technology-renting, and competition between pure bundles leads to the e¢ cient outcome,
implying that pure bundling of digital goods is socially desirable. Second, in the case of
non-digital goods, on the contrary, pure bundling of non-digital goods can generate inef-
cient equilibria; for this reason, banning sales below marginal cost is socially desirable
since this makes all equilibria e¢ cient when bundling (i.e. a menu of bundles) is allowed.
Such a ban prevents the use of pure bundling.
Propositions 5(ii) and 6(i) generate a policy implication on foreclosure even though we
33We know that (9) is satised in Example 3, but (6) fails to hold since V m(BB [ BA)   V m(BB) =
10  7 = 3 > V m(b2B [BA) V m(b2B) = 7  5 = 2. Furthermore, F A = 3 but the strategies pA(b1A) = 2:8
and pB(b1B) = 4, pB(b
2




B) = 5:8 constitute a NE in which C buys B
 = fb1A; b1Bg and
rm As prot is 2.8 < F A.





























have not formally investigated this dynamic issue. According to Proposition 6(i), when
bundling is allowed, in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are
banned, each rm can obtain at least a prot equal to the marginal social contribution
of his portfolio independently of the strategy of the rival rm. Furthermore, according
to Proposition 5(ii), this marginal contribution is the upper bound of any equilibrium
prot under bundling. The results suggest that any incumbents attempt to reduce a
rival rms prot in order to induce the latters exit will fail. Therefore, pure bundling
of digital goods cannot be an instrument of foreclosure. In contrast, in the case of
non-digital goods, prohibiting sales below marginal cost is socially desirable in order to
prevent foreclosure.35
5.4 Comparison
In this section, we compare the case of independent pricing with the case of bundling in
terms of social welfare, sellersprots, and the buyers payo¤. We focus on the setting
of digital goods with independent values and k = 2 described in Section 4.2. In the case
of independent pricing, we consider the pure-strategy NE when it exists (that is, when
y  2z  t) and the mixed-strategy NE described in Proposition 2 when no pure-strategy
NE exists (that is, when y < 2z   t). In the case of bundling, Proposition 6 implies
that there is a unique equilibrium outcome, and thus we consider the outcome of the
technology-renting NE. Then, we have:
Proposition 8 Consider the setting of digital goods with independent values and k = 2
described in Section 4.2.
(i) Social welfare is weakly smaller under independent pricing than under bundling, and
strictly smaller when no pure-strategy equilibrium exists under independent pricing.
(ii) If BB 6= ;, or if BB = ; and z + (z   t)=3 > y, then no pure-strategy equilibrium
exists under independent pricing and the sellerstotal prots are higher under independent
pricing than under bundling. Therefore the buyers payo¤ is lower under independent
pricing than under bundling. Conversely, when a pure-strategy equilibrium exists under
35In the practice of competition policy, below cost pricing has been discussed in the context of predation
and Areeda and Turner (1975) were the rst to propose to use below cost pricing to identify predation.
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independent pricing, the sellerstotal prots are lower (and the buyers payo¤ is higher)
under independent pricing than under bundling.
Since bundling allows a rm to eliminate competition among his own products,
bundling could be expected to increase a rms prot compared to independent pric-
ing. This is true if a pure strategy NE exists under independent pricing, as then each
product sold faces competition from the best product in BnB (see Proposition 1(ii)).
But in the interesting case characterized by BB 6= ; (case 1 in Section 4.2), for instance,
such a NE does not exist and, surprisingly, Proposition 8(ii) shows that prots are higher
in the mixed-strategy NE under independent pricing than under bundling. The reason is
that, as we explained in Section 4.2, both rms are less aggressive in the mixed strategy
NE than in the hypothetical pure strategy NE, which increases their aggregate prots
above the prots under bundling. Then, the buyers payo¤ is necessarily lower under the
mixed strategy NE than under bundling since an ine¢ cient allocation of slots arises and
thus social welfare is reduced in the mixed strategy NE.36
6 Extension: Bundling with slotting contracts
In this section, we study what happens if we allow for slotting contracts. If no seller uses
a slotting contract, the buyer has full freedom in allocating the slots among all products
she purchased. If seller i o¤ers a bundle Bi with a slotting contract, the contract species
the minimum number of slots mi(Bi) that must be occupied by the products in Bi and
a price P si (Bi;mi(Bi)) for the bundle. Therefore, when slotting contracts are allowed,
rm i o¤ers a menu of bundles with prices fPi(Bi); P si (Bi;mi(Bi))gBiBi, where Pi(Bi)
is the price of Bi without slotting contract. A slotting contract specifying mi(Bi) = k is
an exclusive dealing contract.
Under independent pricing, slotting contracts are redundant since the buyer will not
pay a positive price for a product that will not occupy any slot. Under bundling we
nd that Lemma 1 and Proposition 5 apply to the case in which slotting contracts are
36In fact, when BB 6= ;, the sellers face a weak version of prisoners dilemma in the sense that bundling
is a weakly dominant strategy but each seller realizes a weakly smaller prot when bundling is allowed
than when bundling is prohibited.
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allowed. For instance, even though the other rm uses slotting contracts, a rm can
nd a best response among technology-renting strategies without specifying any slotting
contract. However, slotting contracts can render e¢ cient reallocation of slots di¢ cult
and thereby create ine¢ cient equilibria even for digital goods, and even when condition
(8) is imposed, as it occurs in the following example.
Example 5 (slotting contracts and ine¢ ciency) Consider a setting of digital goods with










B)) = (9; 8; 1):
Here B = fb1A; b1B; b2Bg. However, there exists an ine¢ cient NE in which each rm
i chooses mi(Bi) = 3; P si (Bi;mi(Bi)) = P
s
i (Bi; 3) for each Bi  Bi and Pi(Bi) high
enough for each Bi  Bi; this essentially means that each rm o¤ers pure bundling with
exclusivity. Then, Bertrand competition between BA and BB determines the equilibrium
prices P sA(BA; 3) = 5, P sB(BB; 3) = 0. The buyer buys BA, and the products of rm A
occupy the three slots.
The result in the example is similar to the result obtained by OBrien and Sha¤er
(1997) that an ine¢ cient NE can be supported by exclusive dealing. In the example, rm
B with a product in B is unable to induce the buyer to replace an inferior product of rm
A with Bs superior product since A uses a slotting contract.37 This also implies that
Proposition 6(i) does not hold when slotting contracts are allowed. Actually, slotting
contracts can be used as a direct instrument of foreclosure since a dominant rm can
simply buy all slots and thereby foreclose rival rms if this is in its interest.
37We need to note, however, that the NE in Example 5 has a few unappealing features that may make
it implausible. For instance, it is Pareto dominated for the sellers by the technology renting equilibrium
and seller B plays a weakly dominated strategy. Furthermore, given that seller B does not make any
prot, he does not lose anything by proposing a menu that includes renting his technology without
slotting contract at a fee FB = 1 (for instance); but this would destroy the equilibrium as A would nd




We studied in a general setup how bundling a¤ects competition between sellers selling
multiple distinct products to a buyer having a slot constraint. In particular, in the
case of digital goods, we obtained a number of clear-cut results. When bundling is
prohibited, equilibrium in pure strategies generically fails to exist because of the internal
competition among the products belonging to a same seller, and any mixed-strategy
equilibrium involves ine¢ cient allocation of slots. When bundling is allowed, each seller
has an incentive to practice bundling in order to eliminate the internal competition
and, under the mild condition of weak m-submodularity, there is a unique equilibrium
outcome that is e¢ cient. Each seller can nd a best response among pure bundling
strategies and competition among pure bundles leads to the unique equilibrium outcome
mentioned above. Furthermore, pure bundling allows each seller to obtain a prot equal
to the social marginal contribution of his portfolio independently of the rivals strategy.
This suggests that pure bundling of digital goods (and hence block booking of movies)
is socially desirable for e¢ cient allocation of slots and that it cannot be used as an
instrument of foreclosure.
Even though we focused on the slot constraint, all the principles underlying our results
hold independently of such a constraint. As challenging issues for future studies, it would
be interesting to explore a dynamic setting in which we make the portfolio of each rm
endogenous. It would be also interesting to explicitly model a buyer as a downstream
rm and study the interaction between bundling at upstream level and bundling at
downstream level, which is very relevant for cable TV.38
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Appendix
Throughout this appendix, " denotes a number which is positive and close to zero.
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Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The proof is organized in three steps.
Step 1 In any NE, the buyer buys k products.
Suppose that C buys less than k products and thus leaves some slots empty; this requires
that less than k products have positive or zero net surplus. Let bi denote a product in
B which C does not buy: then necessarily pi(bi) > u(bi). Hence, a protable deviation
for rm i exists: set pi(bi) such that ci(bi) < pi(bi) < u(bi) [note that u(bi) > ci(bi) since
bi 2 B]. Now one more product gives a positive net surplus and C buys bi as well as the
products she was buying previously. The prot of rm i increases by pi(bi)  ci(bi) > 0.
Step 2 Let B denote the set of products purchased by the buyer in an arbitrary NE;
then wi(bi) = w for any bi 2 B, for some w  0.
If bi and bj are in B and wi(bi) > wj(bj) (not necessarily j 6= i), then for rm i it is
protable to increase pi(bi) slightly because then C will still buy the products in B and
therefore rm i will make a higher prot. Hence, wi(bi) = wj(bj) for any bi and bj in B
and we let w denote this common value.
Step 3 In any NE the slots are occupied by the e¢ cient products, that is the buyer
buys B; furthermore, w = maxf0;maxbi2BnBfwi(bi)gg.
Suppose that C buys a set B which consists of k products (by Step 1) but there is some
product bi in B which is not in B. We need to distinguish the case in which there exists
a product ~bi 2 BinBi from the case in which Bi  Bi .
In the rst case we have u(~bi)  pi(~bi) = w by Step 2. Consider the deviation of i such
that pi(~bi) is set very high and pi(bi) is set equal to u(bi)  w   ". Then C buys from i
the set of products Bi [fbignf~big, that is product ~bi is replaced by bi. As a consequence,
the prot of i changes by u(bi) w  "  ci(bi)  [u(~bi) w  ci(~bi)] = v(bi)  v(~bi)  ",
and this expression is positive since bi 2 B, ~bi =2 B.
In the second case there exists a product bj of rm j 6= i in BjnBj . By step 2, u(bj)  
pj(bj) = w
 and pj(bj) cj(bj) = u(bj) w cj(bj) is the prot of rm j from the sale of bj;
thus pj(bj) cj(bj)  0. Then rm i can increase his prot by setting pi(bi) = u(bi) w "
and reducing the price of each other product in Bi by "; in this way C continues to buy
all the products in Bi and in addition she buys bi as well. The prot of rm i varies by
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u(bi) w  "  ci(bi) #(Bi)" = u(bi)  ci(bi)  [u(bj)  pj(bj)]  [#(Bi) + 1]" and this
term is positive since pj(bj)  cj(bj) and bi 2 B, bj =2 B.
In order to see that w = maxf0;maxbi2BnBfwi(bi)gg, note that if w is smaller than
maxf0;maxbi2BnBfwi(bi)gg, then C does not buy all the products in B. If w >
maxf0;maxbi2BnBfwi(bi)gg, then rm i with Bi 6= ; can increase his prot by slightly
increasing the prices of his products in Bi since then C will still purchase them.
(ii) Step 1 w  v(bA) = u(bA)  cA(bA).
If w < v(bA), then we exhibit a protable deviation for A: set pA(bA) = cA(bA) + ",
and reduce by "
k
the price of each of his products in BA they are at most k   1. As a
consequence, the net surplus of product bA is v(bA)  " > w and each product in BA has
net surplus equal to w+ "
k
. Thus C buys BA[fbAg from A and the prot of A increases
by at least "  (k   1) "
k
> 0.
Step 2 If (3) is satised, then no NE exists.
When (3) holds we have that v(bA) > wB(bB) for any bB 2 (BBnBB). From Step 1 in
the proof of (ii) we infer that w  v(bA) > 0 and Step 3 in the proof of (i) implies that
w = maxbi2BnBfwi(bi)g = wA(b̂A) for some b̂A 2 (BAnBA) (possibly with b̂A = bA).
What is the most relevant is that w > wB(bB) for any bB 2 (BBnBB). We end the proof
by showing that a protable deviation exists for A. Let A set pA(bA) very high for any
bA 2 (BAn(BA [ fb̂Ag)), increase pA(bA) by " for any bA 2 (BA [ fb̂Ag) such that wA(b̂A)
remains larger than wB(bB) for any bB 2 (BBnBB). Then C still buys all products in B
and As prot is increased because pA(bA) is increased for any bA 2 BA.
(iii) When BB = ;, we know from (i) that in any NE, C buys BA and nothing else.
Hence B = 0, wA(bA) = w for any bA 2 BA and w  v(b1B), since if w < v(b1B)
then setting pB(b1B) = cB(b
1
B) + " is protable deviation for seller B since it induces
C to buy b1B at a price above cB(b
1
B). Regarding As deviations, the most favorable








The only potentially protable deviations for A are such that he sells fewer than k
products to C. The lower are the prices pB(b2B); :::; pB(b
nB
B ), the lower is As prot from
such deviations. However, these prices must satisfy the inequalities wB(bB)  wB(b1B) =








B . Then if A wants to sell only the products in fb1A; b2A; :::; b
j
Ag instead of BA,
for j = 1; :::; k   1, he needs to leave C a net surplus of (bk j+1B ) for each product in







[v(bA)   (bk j+1B )]. Comparing this prot with
A yields (4).
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) We need to verify that the mixed strategies described in Proposition 2(i) constitute
a NE. We start with rm A, and the following lemma is a useful step.
Lemma 2 Given an arbitrary (pure or mixed) strategy played by rm B, if A plays
a pure strategy (px; py) such that x   px < y   py, then there exists (p0x; p0y) such that
x  p0x > y   p0y and As prot with (p0x; p0y) is at least as much as with (px; py).
Proof. Given (px; py) such that x px < y py, let  denote the probability that C buys
both products x and y and let  denote the probability that C buys only y among the
products of A. The expected prot of A is then (px + py) + py. Now consider (p0x; p
0
y)
such that x p0x = y py and y p0y = x px, so that x p0x > y p0y. Then the expected




x = (px+ py)+ (x  y+ py) and this is weakly higher than
the expected prot of A with (px; py).
Now we verify that As strategy in Proposition 2(i) is a best reply to Bs strategy.
As it is well known, it su¢ ces to consider pure strategies of A, and Lemma 2 allows to
restrict to pure strategies satisfying x  px  y   py. Consider rst py 2 [12(y   t); y   t].
Then x   px  y   py  t holds and thus C certainly purchases product x; hence it is
suboptimal for A to play px < x  y + py. Given px = x  y + py, we nd
A = x  y + py + py Prfy   py > g (10)
= x  y + py + pyGB(y   py) = x  t
for any py 2 [12(y   t); y   t].
39 Playing py < 12(y   t) is not a protable deviation for A
since then y  py > 12(y+ t)   with probability one and x  px  y  py implies that C




(y  t) = x  t.
39The strict inequality in (10) is correct in case 1, while in case 2 we should write Prfy   py  g.
But in fact there are no practical di¤erences between the two cases, as GB has no atoms.
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Playing py > y   t is not a protable deviation since then y   py < t thus C certainly
does not buy y and in order to induce C to buy product x, A cannot set px larger than
x  t given that z   pz  t with probability one and pt = 0.
Now we verify that Bs strategy in Proposition 2(i) is a best reply to As strategy.
Since x   px = y   py  t, C does not buy product t and B only needs to choose pz.
When he plays pz 2 [z   12y  
1
2
t; z   t), his payo¤ is






for any pz 2 [z   12y  
1
2
t; z   t).40 Playing pz = z   t is not a protable deviation since
then C does not buy product z in case 2 and buys it with probability GA(t) =
2z t y
2z 2t in
case 1 (then, the prot of B is 2z y t
2z 2t (z   t) = z  
1
2
(y + t)). Playing pz > z   t is not
a protable deviation as it implies z   pz < t and certainly C does not buy product z.
Finally, playing pz < z  12t 
1
y
y is not a protable deviation since C buys product z but





(ii) The payo¤s of the two rms are obtained in (10) and (11). Let a denote the















2z   t  y
2(z   )2 d
=
y   t
2(y   z)2 [y   z + (2z   t  y) ln
2z   t  y
z   t ]:





Suppose that y  z + (z   t)=3. The inequality GA() > GB() is equivalent to h() 
22   (4z   y + t) + 2zy   ty + 2tz   y2 > 0, and y  z + (z   t)=3 implies that h is
strictly decreasing with respect to  2 [t; 1
2
(y + t)], with h(1
2
(y + t)) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1 If BB = ? and (4) is violated, then no pure-strategy NE exists and no e¢ cient
mixed-strategy NE exists.
40The weak inequality in (11) is correct in case 1, while in case 2 we should write Prfz pz > g. But
in fact there are no practical di¤erences between the two cases, as z   pz belongs to (t; 12 (y + t)] from
pz 2 [z   12 (y + t); z   t) and GA has no atoms in (t;
1
2 (y + t)].
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When BB = ? and (4) is violated, we know from Proposition 1(iii) that no pure-strategy
NE exists. We now show that no e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists.
Since BB = ?, e¢ ciency requires that C buy all the products in BA with probability
one, and nothing else; this implies B = 0. Therefore PrfwA(bA)  vB(b1B)g = 1 for each
bA 2 BA, otherwise rm B could play pB(b1B) = cB(b1B) + " and induce C to buy b1B with
positive probability, which would imply B > 0. From PrfwA(bA)  vB(b1B)g = 1 for each
bA 2 BA we infer that A is not larger than
P
bA2BA
[v(bA)  v(b1B)]. Since there exists no
pure-strategy NE, we know from Proposition 1(iii) and (4) that there is some |̂ between








[v(bA)  (bk |̂+1B )]. Note
however that if (bk |̂+1B ) = v(b
1
B), then selling fb1A; b2A; :::; b
|̂
Ag is denitely not a protable
deviation for A since the surplus he needs to leave to C for each of the |̂ products in
fb1A; b2A; :::; b
|̂
Ag is the same as he needs to leave on each of the k products in BA. Thus,
given that selling fb1A; b2A; :::; b
|̂
Ag is a protable deviation for A, it is necessary that
(bk |̂+1B ) = u(b
k |̂+1









[v(bA)  u(bk |̂+1B )] (12)
holds for a certain |̂ < k. We now exhibit a protable deviation for rm A: set pA(bA) =
u(bA)  u(bk |̂+1B ) for bA 2 fb1A; b2A; :::; b
|̂
Ag, and pA(bA) large for bA 2 BAnfb1A; b2A; :::; b
|̂
Ag.
In this way each product in fb1A; b2A; :::; b
|̂
Ag leaves C a net surplus equal to u(b
k |̂+1
B ), and
at most k   |̂ products of rm B leave C a higher net surplus; therefore C buys all the
products in fb1A; b2A; :::; b
|̂
Ag. Firm A earns then u(bA)   u(b
k |̂+1
B )   cA(bA) = v(bA)  
u(bk |̂+1B ) on each bA 2 fb1A; b2A; :::; b
|̂






u(bk |̂+1B )], which is larger than his (supposed) equilibrium prot A, given (12).
Step 2 If BB 6= ? and (3) is satised, then no pure-strategy NE exists and no e¢ cient
mixed-strategy NE exists.
When BB 6= ? and (3) holds, we know from Proposition 1(ii) that no pure-strategy NE
exists: We now show that no e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists.
We assume that an e¢ cient mixed-strategy NE exists and we derive a contradiction.
E¢ ciency requires that C buy all products in BA and B

B with probability one. Therefore
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it is necessary that
PrfwA(bA)  maxfwA(~bA); wB(~bB)gg = 1
PrfwB(bB)  maxfwA(~bA); wB(~bB)gg = 1
for each
bA 2 BA; bB 2 BB and
~bA 2 BAnBA, ~bB 2 BBnBB
(13)
If we dene wMA  inffw : PrfwA(~bA)  w for each ~bA 2 BAnBAg = 1g and wMB  inffw :
PrfwB(~bB)  w for each ~bB 2 BBnBBg = 1g, we can write (13) as
PrfwA(bA)  maxfwMA ; wMB gg = 1
PrfwB(bB)  maxfwMA ; wMB gg = 1
for each bA 2 BA, bB 2 BB.
This suggests that unless wA(bA) = maxfwMA ; wMB g with probability one for each bA 2 BA,
a protable deviation exists for rm A which consists in lowering wA(bA). The same
argument suggests that wB(bB) needs to be equal to maxfwMA ; wMB g with probability one
for each bB 2 BB. Given that wA(bA) = wB(bB) = maxfwMA ; wMB g for each bA 2 BA,
bB 2 BB, it follows that wMA = wMB  wM . Precisely, if wMA > wMB then A can protably
reduce both wMA and wA(bA) for each bA 2 BA; if wMA < wMB , then a symmetric argument
applies.
Finally, since bA 2 BAnBA is the product in BnB with the highest net value, we exhibit
a protable deviation for A: set wA(bA) = wM+" and wA(bA) = wM+" for each bA 2 BA
with probability one. Then C buys all these products of A and As prot changes by
A >  "k + p(bA)   cA(bA) = v(bA)   wM   "(k + 1). We nd that A > 0 since
wM = wMB  u(bB) for some bB 2 (BBnBB), and from (3) we know that v(bA) > u(bB)
for any bB 2 (BBnBB).
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider any arbitrary prole of strategies (si; sj) and let i be the prot of rm i
given (si; sj). We show that i can achieve the same prot i by playing the technology-
renting strategy such that Fi = i. This fact is obvious if i = 0 and therefore we
consider the case of i > 0. In order to prove this result, it su¢ ces to show that the
buyer buys at least one product from i when i plays tri. We nd that, (i) given (tri; sj),
the buyer can make the same payo¤ that she makes with (si; sj) since she can buy the
same products, with the same outlay; (ii) given (tri; sj), the buyer cannot realize a higher
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payo¤ than with (si; sj) without buying at least one product of rm i, because otherwise
she would not buy anything from i given (si; sj), and this contradicts i > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) First we note that if the rms play (trA; tr

B), the buyer rents both As technology
and Bs technology. Precisely, the buyers payo¤ is (i) V  F A F B = V SA +V SB  V   0
if she rents both technologies; (ii) V SA   F A = V SA + V SB   V  if she rents only As
technology; (iii) V SB   F B = V SA + V SB   V  if she rents only Bs technology. Since she
maximizes the social surplus when she is indi¤erent among two or more alternatives, she
rents both technologies and thus buys the products in B.
Now we prove that when rm B plays trB, rm A cannot make a prot larger than F

A
(the same argument applies to rm B). From Lemma 1, it is enough to consider rm As
deviations in the set of technology-renting strategies. Obviously, rm A has no incentive
to decrease FA below F A. If instead A chooses FA = F

A + " with " > 0, then the buyer
rents only Bs technology since she earns a payo¤ V SA + V
S
B   V    " by renting both
technologies or by renting only As technology while she earns V SA +V
S
B  V  by renting
only Bs technology.
(ii) The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a NE such that A makes a
prot higher than F A = V
 V SB . Precisely, suppose that in the NE, the playerspayo¤s
are A(> F A), B and C . Given that A + B + C  V  necessarily holds, we infer
that A > F A implies B + C < V
S
B . Then, let rm B deviate by using trB such that
FB = B + " with " > 0 and such that C < V SB   B   ". This deviation of B is
protable if and only if the buyer buys at least one product from rm B. In order to
prove that this is the case, we note rst that if the buyer does not buy anything from B,
then she buys only bundles o¤ered by A and they cannot yield C a payo¤ larger than C ;
otherwise we obtain a contradiction with the fact that the initial strategies generating
payo¤s (A; B; C) constitute a NE. We end the proof by observing that if the buyer
pays FB and trades only with rm B, a social surplus of V SB is generated and the buyer
obtains V SB   B   ", which is larger than C .
(iii) Suppose that C purchases an ine¢ cient set of products. Then an ine¢ ciently
low social surplus V (< V ) is generated, with payo¤s A  0; B  0; C  0 such
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that A + B + C = V . Now suppose that A plays a technology-renting strategy with
FA = A+ ". By renting As technology and buying B(= BA), C earns V
 A  " and
V    A   " > C = V   A   B.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Without loss of generality, we prove the result for rm A. It is useful to start by
dening Um(B) as maxB0B U(B0) subject to #(B0)  k.
Let rm A play the technology-renting strategy with fee F A = V
m(BA [ BB)  V m(BB).
We prove that, for any strategy of rm B, the buyer rents As technology, and thus A
earns F A. First notice that if C does not rent As technology, then she buys a bundle
BB which solves max [Um(BB)  PB(BB)] with respect to BB  BB. We show that by
renting As technology, the buyer achieves a payo¤ higher than Um( BB)  PB( BB).
Step 1 The case of digital goods.
The payo¤ of C from buying BA [ BB is Um(BA [ BB)   F A   PB( BB). Since costs
are zero, V m(B) = Um(B) for every B  B; thus F A = Um(BA [ BB)   Um(BB) and
(6) holds for Um. Hence F A  Um(BA [ BB)   Um( BB) since BB  BB, and thus
Um(BA [ BB)   F A   PB( BB)  Um( BB)   PB( BB). Thus the buyer obtains a weakly
higher payo¤ by renting As technology than by not renting it; in case of equality, the
tie-breaking rule favors renting As technology because the social surplus is higher.
Step 2 The case in which (8) needs to be satised.
Consider V m(BA [ BB) and let B̂A  BA and B̂B  BB be such that #(B̂A [ B̂B)  k
and V (B̂A [ B̂B) = V m(BA [ BB). The payo¤ of the buyer if she buys B̂A [ B̂B is
U(B̂A [ B̂B)  CA(B̂A)  F A   PB(B̂B) + PB( BB)  PB( BB) (14)
From (6), we obtain F A  V m(BA [ BB)   V m( BB) (since BB  BB) and from (8), we
obtain PB( BB)   PB(B̂B)  CB( BB)   CB(B̂B). Therefore (14) is at least as large as
U(B̂A[ B̂B) CA(B̂A) V m(BA[ BB)+V m( BB)+CB( BB) CB(B̂B) PB( BB), which
is equal to V m( BB) + CB( BB)  PB( BB). From the denitions of V m and Um it follows
that V m( BB)+CB( BB)  Um( BB), and in case of equality, the tie-breaking rule implies
that the buyer rents As technology.
(ii) Step 1 In any NE the payo¤ of the buyer is equal to C , the buyers payo¤ in
the technology-renting NE.
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Given an arbitrary NE, let C denote the buyers payo¤ in that NE. Before showing
that C = C , we prove that C = maxBBBB [U
m(BB)  PB(BB)]  BC and C =
maxBABA [U
m(BA)  PA(BA)]  AC . Consider an arbitrary NE and denote withBA[BB
the bundle purchased by C in this NE, and with B̂A[B̂B  BA[BB the bundle of objects
she uses. We prove that C = BC , as C = 
A
C is proved analogously. First notice that
the inequality C < BC cannot hold (if C < 
B
C , then C is not the equilibrium payo¤ of
C). Thus we show that if C > BC , then there exists a protable deviation for A which
consists of playing the technology-renting strategy such that FA = F A + " (recall that
As equilibrium prot is F A). If C refuses to rent As technology, then her payo¤ is 
B
C ; if
instead she buys BA[BB and uses B̂A[ B̂B, just like before the deviation of A, then her
payo¤ is C  ", the same as before minus ". Since C > BC , it follows that C  " > BC .
Now we show that C = C . First notice that the inequality C > 

C cannot hold since
then the sum of payo¤s is F A + F

B + C > V
, which is impossible. Thus we prove
that in case C < C , there exists a protable deviation for A which consists of playing
the technology-renting strategy with FA = F A + ". If C does not rent As technology,
then her payo¤ is C = BC as we have seen above. But C can make a higher payo¤
by renting As technology and buying and using only BSA : in this way her payo¤ is
V SA   F A   " = C   " > C .
Step 2 Each NE is e¢ cient.
From Propositions 5(ii) and 6(i), and from Step 1, we know that in any NE the prots
of the rms are F A; F

B and the payo¤ of the buyer is 









follows that any NE generates a social surplus equal to V , and thus it is e¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 7
Step 1 The case in which (8) needs to be satised.
Suppose that in equilibrium C buys a set B which is ine¢ cient. Then, from (9) it follows
that there exists B0 = (B0A; B
0
B) such that #B
0  k, U(B0)   CA(B0A)   CB(B0B) >
Um(B) CA(BA) CB(BB) and B0i  Bi for (at least) one rm i. A protable deviation
for rm j is the technology-renting strategy with Fj = j + ". Precisely, if after this
deviation C buys B0i and B
0
j, then her payo¤ is U(B
0) Pi(B0i) j " Cj(B0j), which now
we prove to be larger than her payo¤before the deviation, Um(B) Pi(Bi) j Cj(Bj).
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Precisely, we need to show that
Pi(Bi)  Pi(B0i) > "+ Um(B)  U(B0) + Cj(B0j)  Cj(Bj): (15)
From (8) we obtain Pi(Bi)   Pi(B0i)  Ci(Bi)   Ci(B0i), and thus a su¢ cient condition
for (15) to hold is
Ci(Bi)  Ci(B0i) > "+ Um(B)  U(B0) + Cj(B0j)  Cj(Bj);
which is equivalent to U(B0)  CA(B0A)  CB(B0B)  " > Um(B)  Ci(Bi)  Cj(Bj).
Step 2 The case of digital goods.
For the case of digital goods, consider again the deviation of rm j such that he plays
the technology-renting strategy with Fj = j + ". After this deviation, let C buy Bi and
B0j and use B
0
i  Bi and B0j. Then Cs payo¤ is U(B0)  Pi(Bi)  j   ", which is larger
than Cs payo¤ before the deviation, Um(B)  Pi(Bi)  j, since U(B0) > Um(B).
Proof of Proposition 8
The result is immediate from Propositions 1, 2 and 6.
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